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Article 3

REGULATORY HIDE AND SEEK: WHAT
AGENCIES CAN (AND CAN’T) DO TO
LIMIT JUDICIAL REVIEW
Bryan Clark*
Amanda C. Leiter**
Abstract: Many authors discuss judicial oversight of agency actions. Our
subject, which is less well examined, is agencies’ role in modulating that
oversight. We consider cases in which the timing or form of an agency action has curtailed judicial review of the agency’s policy choices. In some
such cases, the agency’s choice of form deprived the court of statutory or
Article III jurisdiction. In others, the court chose to delay or deny review to
avoid interfering with agency policy development. Despite these differences, though, all such “reviewability” cases pose important constitutional
questions about the degree to which an agency should be able to limit judicial oversight of its activities. We argue that courts pay too little attention to
these questions, and we propose a more systematic framework for evaluating the constitutional implications of allowing an agency to modulate the
availability of judicial review by manipulating the structure of its actions.

Introduction
The “dominant narrative of modern administrative law” states that
courts are “key players who help tame, and thereby legitimate, the exercise of administrative power.”1 This narrative underlies the U.S. Su© 2011, Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter.
* Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. J.D., Catholic University,
2010, summa cum laude. I would like to thank Professor Leiter for inviting me to join her
in this venture.
** Associate Professor of Law, American University’s Washington College of Law. Many
thanks to Catholic University’s Columbus School of Law and Dean Veryl Miles for supporting this work. Thanks also to Judith Childers, Louis Cohen, Cara Drinan, Amanda Frost,
RonNell Andersen Jones, Megan La Belle, James Merrill, Caprice Roberts, Sam Sankar,
Glen Staszewski, Robert Tsai, and David Zaring for, in varying measures, terrific research
assistance, sound advice, good insights, and honest edits.
1 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1383, 1413
(2004); see also Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 320 (1965)
(“The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally valid.”); Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World,
72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 987, 1023 (1997) (stating that judicial review has the potential to
“contribut[e] . . . to the legitimation of the regulatory process”); Elena Kagan, Presidential
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preme Court’s familiar “presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.”2 The narrative also explains the Court’s viscerally
negative reaction to the suggestion, in the 2010 case Kucana v. Holder,3
that ambiguous language in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
should be read to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to
shield certain of his asylum decisions from court review.4 Such an “extraordinary delegation,” the Kucana Court said, would give “the Executive . . . a free hand to shelter its own decisions from abuse-of-discretion
appellate court” oversight.5 Lower courts, too, have objected to the
seeming irregularity of permitting agencies to shelter their decisions
from review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, for
example, has stated (without citation) that it is “axiomatic” that Congress cannot delegate to an agency the power “to oust state courts and
federal district courts of subject matter jurisdiction.”6 If agencies could
hide their actions from judicial oversight, the dominant narrative asks,
what would ensure the fundamental lawfulness of those actions?
Anyone familiar with the convoluted question of “reviewability”7 in
administrative law must acknowledge, though, that agencies regularly
act in ways that either restrict courts’ jurisdiction or otherwise limit judicial review. In other words, agencies frequently do “shelter [their]
own decisions” from court oversight.8 More curiously, in reviewability
cases, in contrast to statutory interpretation cases like Kucana, courts
often acquiesce in the resulting curtailment of their purview.9
Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2350 (2001) (identifying “judicial review” as “a
simple, if sometimes imperfect, solution to the problem” of presidential lawlessness).
2 Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 839 (2010); see also Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434 (1995) (recognizing the presumption); Reno v. Catholic Soc.
Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63–64 (1993) (same); McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498
U.S. 479, 496 (1991) (noting the “well-settled presumption favoring interpretations of
statutes that allow judicial review of administrative action”); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (invoking the presumption); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (same).
3 130 S. Ct. at 839–40. One of the authors, Amanda C. Leiter, was appointed by the
Court to serve as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below for this case.
4 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended
in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)).
5 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 839–40.
6 Miller v. FCC, 66 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Carlyle Towers Condo.
Ass’n v. FDIC, 170 F.3d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is ‘axiomatic’ that agencies can neither grant nor curtail federal court jurisdiction . . . .”). But see Owens v. Republic of Sudan,
531 F.3d 884, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s “axiomatic” dicta).
7 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise 1217–1400 (5th
ed. 2010) (discussing reviewability doctrines).
8 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 839–40.
9 See infra notes 133–248 and accompanying text.
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Three examples prove this point. First, “[g]enerally speaking, it is
much more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain judicial review of agency
inaction . . . than of agency action.”10 Yet the decision to refrain from
regulating or taking an enforcement action does as much to delimit the
relevant statutory and regulatory regime as would any reviewable rulemaking or prosecution. Consider, for example, the paradigmatic inaction case of Heckler v. Chaney, decided by the Supreme Court in 1985.11
In Heckler, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) decided not to
enforce the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s (FDCA) “misbranding”
provisions, which prohibit the “unapproved use of an approved drug,”
against two states that were using otherwise-approved drugs in prison
executions without FDA approval.12 The Supreme Court declared the
FDA’s non-enforcement decision “presumptively unreviewable.”13 Plainly, though, the agency’s choice not to enforce the misbranding provisions in the execution context embodied substantive decisions about
enforcement priorities and, in turn, about the limits of the provisions’
reach. As a practical matter, a statute’s prohibitions extend only as far as
the implementing agency is prepared to enforce them. As Heckler makes
clear, therefore, agencies shield some policy choices from judicial oversight when they decline to act.14
Second, some statutes permit agencies to establish administrative
review schemes that must be exhausted before an affected individual
may obtain judicial review. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), for example, an inmate who asserts that prison officials have
violated his civil rights must exhaust any applicable prison review procedures before he may file suit in federal court.15 If he fails to exhaust
10 Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and
Inaction, 26 Va. Envtl. L.J. 461, 465 (2008); see Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell,
Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1157, 1188 (2009) (“Although agency inaction is sometimes grounds for legal challenge, in
practice it is extremely difficult to drag an agency into court to defend its policymaking
reticence.”); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832–33 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review
under [section] 701(a)(2) [of the Administrative Procedure Act].”). But see Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007) (reviewing the EPA’s denial of a petition for rulemaking).
11 470 U.S. at 823–24.
12 Id. (citing a prior version of 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)).
13 Id. at 832–33.
14 See id. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1657 (2004) (arguing that current law on agency inaction allows agencies to shelter arbitrary decisions from outside oversight).
15 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006) (citing a prior version of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a)).
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these remedies within applicable time limits, he may find himself permanently barred from obtaining federal court review of his civil rights
claim.16 Thus, agencies can (and do) curtail court review of their actions by establishing administrative review procedures that are sufficiently onerous (without violating due process protections17) to dissuade or bar some claimants.18
Finally, some statutes restrict the categories of agency action that
courts may review. For instance, the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) and numerous substantive statutes limit judicial review to final
agency actions.19 Other statutes are still more restrictive. The Atomic
Energy Act (AEA), for example, limits review to final Nuclear Regulatory Commission decisions “granting, suspending, revoking, or amending” a nuclear power facility’s license or construction permit.20 Under
provisions like these, “[t]he form of the regulatory action dictates the

16 Id.
17 A state bureau of prisons that attempted to curtail judicial review by establishing an
absurdly onerous administrative exhaustion precondition—such as a requirement to file
any administrative grievance within an hour of an alleged civil rights abuse—would presumably run afoul of the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause. See U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. The Ngo majority declined to reach this question, but it did not take issue with
the fifteen-working-day period of limitations imposed under California law. 548 U.S. at 86,
102–03.
Respondent contends that requiring proper exhaustion will lead prison administrators to devise procedural requirements that are designed to trap unwary prisoners and thus to defeat their claims. . . . [W]ith respect to the possibility that prisons might create procedural requirements for the purpose of
tripping up all but the most skillful prisoners, while Congress repealed the
“plain, speedy, and effective” standard, we have no occasion here to decide
how such situations might be addressed.
Id. at 102–03 (citation omitted).
18 See id. at 118 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
[T]he Court’s engraftment of a procedural default sanction into the PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement risks barring [meritorious] claims when a prisoner
fails, inter alia, to file her grievance (perhaps because she correctly fears retaliation) within strict time requirements that are generally no more than 15
days, and that, in nine States, are between 2 and 5 days.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
19 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (APA finality requirement); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2006)
(Immigration and Nationality Act finality requirement for review of removal orders); 10
U.S.C. § 950g(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (Military Commissions Act finality requirement);
42 U.S.C. § 2239 (2006) (Atomic Energy Act finality requirement); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
(Social Security Act finality requirement).
20 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a), (b)(1); see Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 680 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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. . . availability and nature of judicial review.”21 As a result, the implementing agency can choose to begin policy development via ostensibly
unreviewable forms of action, thereby potentially “immunizing its lawmaking from judicial review.”22
Indeed, the facts of some reviewability cases in this third category
strongly suggest that the agency deliberately sought to insulate its policy
choices from court oversight. For example, in Reckitt Benckiser, Inc. v.
EPA, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 2010,
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sent a letter to pesticide
manufacturer Reckitt Benckiser, Inc. (“Reckitt”), stating that, unless the
company made various safety-enhancing changes to the marketing,
packaging, and distribution of its rodenticides, the products “would be
considered misbranded” under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) beginning in June 2011.23 Reckitt sued, claiming the EPA had no authority to issue such a threat without first cancelling the registration of the rodenticides—a move that would have required the agency to prove its case before an administrative law judge
and then a federal court of appeals.24 Responding to Reckitt’s suit, the
EPA asserted that its initial warning letter was neither final nor ripe for
review.25 The EPA thus sought a regulatory outcome (changes to Reckitt’s products), and made two strategic moves in an effort to insulate its
regulatory activities from court oversight: first proceeding via a warning
letter rather than a cancellation hearing, and then arguing that the letter itself was unreviewable because it was nonfinal and unripe.26
As these three examples illustrate, reviewability doctrines enable
agencies to wield significant de facto control over the scope of court
oversight. Yet this control is in some tension with both due process
principles27 and the “[s]eparation-of-powers concerns” that “caution[ed]” the Kucana Court “against reading legislation, absent clear
statement, to place in executive hands authority to remove cases from
the Judiciary’s domain.”28

21 Magill, supra note 1, at 1420.
22 Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concluding that
the EPA’s Periodic Monitoring Guidance, which set out certain requirements for Title V
permits issued under the Clean Air Act, was final and reviewable despite its “Guidance” title).
23 613 F.3d 1131, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
24 Id. at 1134.
25 Id. at 1136.
26 Id.
27 Ngo, 548 U.S. at 102–03.
28 130 S. Ct. at 834.
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To be sure, reviewability doctrines differ in the degree to which
they curtail judicial authority,29 and in the consequences of that curtailment for regulated entities and concerned third parties.30 Moreover,
some courts are wise to agency maneuvering and exert oversight authority despite the seemingly unreviewable form or timing of the agency’s
action. In Reckitt, for example, the D.C. Circuit ultimately deemed the
EPA’s warning letter both final and ripe despite its epistolary form.31
Similarly, in a 2000 case, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit
reviewed an EPA Clean Air Act Guidance despite the apparently nonbinding and nonfinal form of the document (which had not undergone
notice-and-comment rulemaking).32 The tenor of the Appalachian Power
opinion is quite telling—although the court purported to apply the traditional finality inquiry, it prefaced its discussion with a lengthy critique
of agency efforts to evade APA procedural requirements and judicial
review provisions.
The phenomenon we see in this case is familiar. Congress
passes a broadly worded statute. The agency follows with regulations containing broad language, open-ended phrases, ambiguous standards and the like. Then as years pass, the agency
issues circulars or guidance or memoranda, explaining, interpreting, defining and often expanding the commands in the
regulations. . . . Law is made, without notice and comment,
without public participation, and without publication in the
Federal Register or the Code of Federal Regulations. . . . An
agency operating in this way gains a large advantage. “It can
issue or amend its real rules . . . quickly and inexpensively
without following any statutorily prescribed procedures.” The

29 See, e.g., Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (noting that the
statutory provisions barring review work to strip courts of jurisdiction, whereas the APA’s
“committed to agency discretion limitation and the final agency action requirement are
‘not . . . jurisdictional bar[s]’” (quoting Oryszak v. Sullivan, 576 F.3d 522, 524–26 (D.C. Cir.
2009)) (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 353 n.4 (1984) and Ass’n of
Civilian Technicians, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 283 F.3d 339, 341 (D.C. Cir.
2002))).
30 The exhaustion doctrine, for example, bars review only if the aggrieved party fails to
take advantage of whatever administrative procedures the agency has created.
31 Reckitt, 613 F.3d at 1140. The court then left it to the district judge to decide whether
FIFRA permits the EPA to “bring enforcement proceedings for misbranding before, or rather
than, regulatory cancellation proceedings . . . .” Id. at 1141.
32 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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agency may also think there is another advantage—immunizing its
lawmaking from judicial review.33
Plainly, the court felt that allowing agencies to achieve significant regulatory outcomes via a string of “unreviewable” actions would defeat administrative law’s ideals of openness, participation, and oversight.34
As Reckitt and Appalachian Power make clear, reviewability doctrines
are malleable, and agencies and courts alike can manipulate the doctrines to achieve widely varying levels of policy oversight.35 The net result is an unpredictable and ad hoc process in which protection of separation of powers and due process principles depends on the relative
willingness of agency policymakers (who determine the timing and
form of an agency’s actions) and judges (who decide whether to acquiesce in an agency’s reviewability objection or instead to assert oversight
authority). In light of “the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action,”36 we argue that
courts need a more systematic framework to evaluate the constitutional
implications of an agency’s efforts to structure its actions so as to limit
court oversight.37
In Part I, we outline such a framework, identifying four constitutional issues that lurk in all reviewability cases.38 Three issues stem from
separation of powers principles (we term these “Article III infringement,” “nondelegation,” and “underdelegation”), while one derives
from the due process right (we term this “individual rights infringe33 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 85 (1995)).
34 Id.
35 See Reckitt, 613 F.3d at 1140; Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1020.
36 Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 707 (2011)
(alterations in original) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U. S. 150, 154 (1999)) (discussing the proper standard for reviewing Treasury Department regulations). Although the
Mayo Court was extolling the virtue of maintaining a uniform standard of review across
regulatory subject areas, there is equal value in maintaining uniform standards for determining whether such review is available at all.
37 Indeed, except in rare cases like Kucana that squarely present the issue, courts in reviewability cases almost never expressly consider whether constitutional principles like
separation of powers and due process permit an agency to curtail court oversight. Instead,
judges focus their attention on whichever narrow reviewability doctrines apply in the particular case, entirely ignoring the fact that the invocation and applicability of those doctrines are largely within the agency’s control. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004) (focusing on reviewability of Bureau of Land Management’s
failure to regulate off-road vehicle use in certain wilderness study areas); Ohio Forestry
Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 728–32 (1998) (focusing on ripeness of plaintiffs’
challenge to a U.S. Forest Service Land and Resource Management Plan).
38 See infra notes 49–132 and accompanying text.
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ment”). Then, in Part II, we turn our attention to a more theoretical
question: if agencies regularly manipulate the form of their actions to
“immuniz[e] [their] lawmaking from judicial review,”39 what remains
of the claim that courts are “key players who help tame, and thereby
legitimate, the exercise of administrative power”?40 To shed some light
on this question, we apply our rubric to three recent reviewability cases:
(1) Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA),41 a 2004 case in
which the Supreme Court refused to review the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) failure to regulate off-road vehicle use on pristine
federal lands in Utah; (2) Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club,42 a 1998 case
in which the Supreme Court fleshed out aspects of the ripeness doctrine in the context of a dispute about a management plan for Ohio’s
Wayne National Forest; and (3) Amador County v. Salazar,43 a 2011 case
in which the D.C. Circuit disagreed with the Secretary of the Interior
about the reviewability of the Secretary’s “‘no-action’ approval” of an
Indian gaming compact.44
Our analysis of these decisions suggests, counterintuitively, that
agency manipulation of reviewability doctrines may pose a greater
threat to congressional authority and executive legitimacy than to judicial authority. Where Congress has created an administrative regime
that relies on judicial review for its legitimacy, as in the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA), an agency that invokes reviewability doctrines to evade court oversight undermines that legislative vision and, in
turn, erodes the constitutional foundation for the agency’s own actions.45
As a remedy for this and the other potential constitutional infirmities that lurk in reviewability cases, we suggest that federal courts evaluating a reviewability objection in an administrative law case should routinely consider the separation of powers and due process implications
of delaying or denying review. In the majority of reviewability cases, application of this rubric would be quite simple, and the outcome of the
case would not change. As we discuss below, the relevant constitutional
concerns are rarely implicated. Yet applying the rubric would not be an
39 Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1020.
40 Magill, supra note 1, at 1413; see infra notes 133–249 and accompanying text.
41 542 U.S. at 69.
42 523 U.S. at 733.
43 640 F.3d at 380.
44 Id. at 373.
45 National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered portions of 16 U.S.C. (2006)).
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empty exercise. Heretofore, courts have largely deferred to agencies’
decisions about the form and timing of their actions—even in cases in
which those decisions have the consequence of deferring or precluding review.
Like the clear statement rule adopted in Kucana,46 our rubric would
ensure that courts think twice before allowing an agency to “immuniz[e] its lawmaking from judicial review.”47 Further, the rubric would
provide a sounder footing for decisions like Appalachian Power, in which
courts choose to assert oversight authority despite the ostensibly unreviewable form or timing of the agency’s action.48
I. The Constitutional Concerns Lurking in Reviewability Cases
We posit that executive curtailment of judicial review raises four
possible constitutional problems. The first three, which we call “Article
III infringement,” “nondelegation,” and “underdelegation,” arise from
separation of powers principles and correspond to each of the three
branches of government—Judicial, Legislative, and Executive, respectively—whose powers might be infringed or improperly aggrandized by
allowing the form or timing of an agency’s action to affect the scope of
judicial review. Specifically, Article III infringement covers that narrow
class of cases in which an agency’s curtailment of the scope of judicial
review encroaches on some constitutionally irreducible power of the
federal courts.49 Nondelegation, on the other hand, encompasses two
potential congressional misdeeds: (1) delegation of “the wrong kind of
power, i.e., ‘non-Executive’ power”; or (2) delegation of “too much
power.”50 Finally, underdelegation applies to administrative regimes
that rely on judicial review of agency action for their legitimacy. When
Congress has created such a regime, we contend, an agency that structures its actions so as to curtail or evade review exceeds its statutory
mandate and delegitimizes the applicable regime.
The fourth potential constitutional problem, which we term “individual rights infringement,” arises not from the structure of government but from the rights of an individual plaintiff, offended by an
agency’s action but unable to obtain court review. Sometimes, the bar46 130 S. Ct. at 834.
47 Appalachian Power, 208 F.3d at 1020.
48 Id.
49 But see Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 Harv. L.
Rev. 869, 874 (2011) (noting that “[m]any commentators have concluded, based on the
text and structure of Article III, that” Congress’s authority to restrict federal court jurisdiction is “plenary”).
50 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 480 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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rier to review of the plaintiff’s claim derives from Article III or prudential limits on judicial interference with the execution of the laws (as
with a plaintiff who lacks standing to pursue claims).51 In other reviewability cases, though, the individual or entity injured by agency action
may have a due process right of access to the courts that the Executive
may not constitutionally abridge.52
A. Article III Infringement
In evaluating an agency’s claim that something it did (or left undone) is unreviewable, the most obvious separation of powers question
is whether acceding to the agency’s request to curtail review would infringe on some constitutionally irreducible power of the federal courts.
We label this possibility “Article III infringement.”53 (The conceptually
distinct issue of whether it is appropriate for the Executive—rather than
51 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148–49 (2009) (noting that
the standing inquiry “reflect[s] [a] fundamental limitation” on the power of the federal
courts, constraining them to “redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury to
persons caused by private or official violation of law,” not to “review and revise legislative
and executive action”). But see, e.g., Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 Yale L.J. 816, 817–18 (1969); Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 159, 168 n.39 (2011) (noting that “a number of scholars have demonstrated that [the standing doctrine’s] strict limitations to access
to the courts would have been foreign to the Founders” (citing Cass R. Sunstein, What’s
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 163, 170–79
(1992))); George Van Cleve, Congressional Power to Confer Broad Citizen Standing in Environmental Cases, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,028, 10,034–37 (1999).
52 The Supreme Court has recently observed, for example, that a U.S. citizen is entitled to “make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his
Government,” even if that citizen is detained as an enemy combatant. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004); see also South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 393 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that “Congress cannot, consistently
with due process, deny a taxpayer with property rights at stake all opportunity for an ultimate judicial determination of the legality of a tax assessment against him”).
53 There is, of course, a different sort of Article III problem that could arise in some
reviewability cases: a court’s decision to deny review of an agency’s action could, in theory,
infringe a plaintiff’s “‘right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.’” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218
(1980)). That is, there could be an individual Article III right distinct from the structural
right. That said, the Court has had “little occasion to discuss the nature or significance” of
this individual Article III safeguard. Id. We therefore assume, for purposes of this Article,
that if Article III does indeed bestow an individual right of access to the courts in some
cases, that right is adequately protected by enforcing the individual’s due process rights,
on the one hand, and Article III’s structural protections, on the other. The latter is the
subject of the present discussion; the former is discussed below. See infra notes 113–132
and accompanying text.
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Congress—to wield authority over court jurisdiction is addressed below
under “Nondelegation.”)
Whether federal courts enjoy a constitutionally protected domain
is a subject of longstanding debate.54 The “traditional view”55 contends
that the text of Article III—specifically (1) the Exceptions and Regulations Clause, which subjects the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
to “such Exceptions, and . . . Regulations as the Congress shall make”;56
and (2) the belittling reference in Section 1 to “such inferior courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”57—gives
Congress plenary power to restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and the inferior courts’ original and appellate jurisdiction.58
Other theorists argue, though, that the structure if not the text of the
Constitution provides some limits on Congress’s authority in this regard.59 One of the participants in Henry M. Hart, Jr.’s dialogue, for example, famously suggests that “the exceptions [to the Supreme Court’s

54 See Grove, supra note 49, at 870 (outlining the debate).
55 Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1883, 1885 n.4 (2008)
(identifying proponents of this view).
56 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
57 Id. art. III, § 1.
58 See Grove, supra note 49, at 874–75 (identifying the textual support for this traditional view and citing, among others, John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 204 (1997); Martin
H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpretation of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1633, 1637 (1990); and Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum.
L. Rev. 1001, 1005 (1965)).
59 It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify the many authors who have recently
expounded this less traditional view. For a few key examples, see Akhil Reed Amar, Taking
Article III Seriously: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 442, 445 (1991); Steven G.
Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1002, 1005 (2007) (“Simply
put, Article III requires that the federal judiciary be able to exercise all of the judicial power of the United States that is vested by the Constitution and that the Supreme Court must
have the final judicial word in all cases . . . that raise federal issues.”); Laurence Claus, The
One Court That Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 Geo. L.J.
59, 64 (2007) (“Congress cannot use its Exceptions power to achieve particular desired
answers to questions that fall within the judicial Power of the United States.”).
[M]y root textual argument is this: Article III plainly requires that the judicial
power of the United States “shall [that is, must] be vested” in the federal judiciary, which includes one Supreme Court that “shall” (again, must) be established, and inferior federal courts that “may,” but need not, be created. And
that very same “judicial power shall [here too, must] extend,” in the form of
either original or appellate jurisdiction, “to all cases” involving federal questions, admiralty, and ambassadors.
Amar, supra, at 445 (alterations in original).
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appellate jurisdiction] must not be such as will destroy the essential role
of the . . . Court in the constitutional plan.”60
We need not take a side in this debate. For our purposes, it is sufficient to identify the implications of the debate for reviewability cases: if
Article III restricts Congress’s authority to strip federal courts of certain
kinds of jurisdiction, then of course those restrictions extend at least
equally to executive encroachment on the judicial sphere. It is therefore possible that in some small subset of reviewability cases, an agency’s erection of a jurisdictional roadblock (as, for example, when an
agency decides to proceed via some statutorily unreviewable form of
action61) could infringe on the courts’ constitutionally protected
sphere. Importantly, however, this problem can arise only in those cases
in which an agency raises a truly jurisdictional, rather than prudential,
reviewability objection.62 The reason is straightforward: the objection
must be jurisdictional in nature because a court’s constitutionally protected sphere of influence cannot be threatened by the court’s own decision to delay or deny review for purely discretionary reasons.63
As for the mechanics of assessing whether Article III infringement
is present, a court must ask itself only whether the Constitution would
permit Congress to limit judicial review in the way that the agency purports to do. If Congress could do so, then the agency’s assertion of the
same authority may pose nondelegation, underdelegation, or individual rights problems, all of which are discussed below, but it does not
infringe on an irreducible power of the courts.
B. Nondelegation
The next separation of powers question lurking in reviewability
cases is whether the agency plausibly has authority to limit judicial review in the way it attempts to. This is really a two-part question. First,
does the Constitution permit Congress to grant the agency the authority

60 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1365 (1953). For a comprehensive discussion of
the current state of the literature on the issue of Congress’s power to strip the Supreme
Court of appellate jurisdiction and federal inferior courts of appellate and original jurisdiction, see generally Grove, supra note 49.
61 See Block, 467 U.S. at 353 n.4 (“[C]ongressional preclusion of judicial review is in effect jurisdictional . . . .”).
62 See Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 380 (distinguishing between reviewability arguments
that are jurisdictional and those that are prudential).
63 See id.
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to curtail court oversight? Second, did Congress grant the agency that
authority in the relevant statute?
Our rubric addresses the first part of this compound question under the heading “Nondelegation.” Complicating matters, nondelegation
itself has two subparts, both flagged by Justice Breyer in his dissenting
opinion in the 1998 Supreme Court case Clinton v. City of New York.64
First, at least in theory, Congress may have delegated the wrong kind of
power to the agency—as, to use an extreme example, if Congress passed
a statute calling on the EPA to “write all laws necessary for protection of
the environment” (thereby delegating true legislative power to an agency).65 Second, Congress may have delegated too much power to the agency, even though that power has the right constitutional flavor.66 To continue the above example, this kind of nondelegation problem would be
present in a statute that called on the EPA to “issue regulations to protect clean air.” Now the problem is not that the delegated power is formally legislative (“write all laws”), but instead that the power is functionally legislative—Congress wrote a statute so broad, and so lacking in
content, that the agency is left to make all of the difficult policy choices
about how to achieve Congress’s ill-defined objective.67
The former, more clear-cut nondelegation problem almost never
arises because it is the rare statute that expressly delegates pure legislative power to an agency.68 That said, in the 1892 Supreme Court case

64 524 U.S. at 480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 416–17, 419–20 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between the nature and
the extent of a delegation).
65 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding—contrary to the plurality’s
view—that section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 runs afoul of
the nondelegation doctrine in part because Congress avoided “hard choices” that were
“both fundamental for purposes of the statute and yet politically so divisive that the necessary decision or compromise was difficult, if not impossible, to hammer out in the legislative forge”).
68 But see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In evaluating the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Justice Scalia concluded:
In the present case, . . . a pure delegation of legislative power is precisely what
we have before us. It is irrelevant whether the standards [for writing the
Guidelines] are adequate, because they are not standards related to the exercise of executive or judicial powers; they are, plainly and simply, standards for
further legislation.
Id.
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Field v. Clark, the Court clearly indicated its view of this kind of congressional abdication:
That congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained
by the Constitution. . . . “The true distinction . . . is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.”69
The real difficulty arises, of course, in determining whether a statute is so vague and lacking in standards that it effectively delegates
“power to make the law” even as it purports only to grant “authority or
discretion as to [the law’s] execution.”70 The Supreme Court has consistently (if not very stringently) policed this line by requiring that
“when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies [it]
must ‘lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.’”71
In practice, the intelligible principle requirement does little to
constrain Congress’s ability to transfer sweeping quasi-legislative authority to agencies.
In the history of the Court [it has] found the requisite “intelligible principle” lacking in only two statutes, one of which
provided literally no guidance for the exercise of [agency]
discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a
standard than stimulating the economy by assuring “fair competition.”72
On the other hand, “the Court has upheld congressional delegations based upon the ‘vague and indefinite’ principles of ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity,’ and what is ‘generally fair and equita-

69 143 U.S. 649, 692–94 (1892) (emphasis added) (quoting Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co. v.
Comm’rs of Clinton Cnty., 1 Ohio St. 77, 88–89 (1852)).
70 Id.
71 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citation omitted).
72 Id. at 474.
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ble,’ or ‘requisite . . . to protect the public health.’”73 If the “intelligible
principle” doctrine retains any force, therefore, it is in its use as an interpretive guide for narrowing ambiguous statutory language that, read
broadly, would give an agency too little guidance about how to proceed.74 The “doctrine, in other words, now operates exclusively
through the interpretive canon requiring avoidance of serious constitutional questions.”75 Interpret ambiguous statutory language narrowly,
the doctrine instructs, to avoid the delegation of “excessively openended authority to the President.”76
To apply the nondelegation doctrine to reviewability cases, courts
must first identify the type of power an agency wields when it claims that
an action is unreviewable because, for example, the action is nonfinal or
unripe, or administrative remedies remain unexhausted. There are
three possibilities. First, if the agency’s reviewability objection calls on
the court to exercise truly prudential authority to delay or deny review
(as with some ripeness77 arguments, for example), then the agency is
merely engaging in a conversation with the court about the best uses of
the agency’s and the court’s time and expertise. In such a case, there is
no need to apply the nondelegation doctrine, because the agency is discussing the efficient execution of the relevant laws (an eminently executive function) rather than wielding a delegated power over the courts.
Second, if the agency’s reviewability objection goes to the very existence
of “a justiciable case or controversy under Article III”78 (as with many

73 Bryan Clark, Comment, Refining the Nondelegation Doctrine in Light of REAL ID Act
102(c): Time to Stop Bulldozing Constitutional Barriers for a Border Fence, 58 Cath. U. L. Rev.
851, 860 (2009).
74 Mistretta, 488 U. S. at 373 n.7 (“In recent years, our application of the nondelegation
doctrine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more
particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise
be thought to be unconstitutional.”).
75 John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Cannon of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 223, 223.
76 Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 4,
67–68 (2009).
77 “The ripeness doctrine is ‘drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power
and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction . . . .’” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003) (quoting Reno v. Catholic
Social Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)). Here we refer only to the prudential aspects of ripeness, such as the “‘[p]roblems of prematurity and abstractness’ that may prevent adjudication in all but the exceptional case.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 114 (1976)
(quoting Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972)).
78 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2010).
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standing79 arguments), then the agency is merely reminding the court
of preexisting constitutional limits on judicial authority. Again, the nondelegation doctrine is not relevant to such a case, because the limits on
the court’s authority derive from the Constitution rather than from any
affirmative assertion by the agency of delegated power to curtail court
oversight.
The third possibility is more interesting. If the agency asserts that
the form or timing of its action narrows the court’s purview, then the
agency is effectively wielding power over the court’s jurisdiction. The
same is true if the agency argues that jurisdiction is lacking because the
plaintiff failed to exhaust an agency-created administrative remedy. In
either case, the agency is effectively arguing that something it did (or
failed to do, or some administrative review scheme that it created) has
the effect of narrowing the Judiciary’s sphere of influence. The only
possible constitutional root of such power is Congress’s authority, in
Article III, to “ordain and establish . . . inferior courts,”80 and to “regulat[e]” and “make . . . exceptions” to the Supreme Court’s “appellate
jurisdiction.”81 If an agency argues that its affirmative choices have consequences for the scope of court jurisdiction, the agency must be wielding delegated legislative authority over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
The Supreme Court long ago accepted that Congress may delegate
the power “‘to regulate the practice and procedure of federal courts’”
to another branch of government.82 Justice Blackmun summarized this
history in 1989 in Mistretta v. United States, an unsuccessful nondelegation challenge to the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s authority to
promulgate sentencing guidelines for the Judiciary:
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., . . . we upheld a challenge to certain
rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
which conferred upon the Judiciary the power to promulgate
federal rules of civil procedure. . . . We observed: “Congress
79 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Though some of its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government,
the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.”).
80 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”) (emphasis added).
81 Id. art. III, § 2 (“In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.”) (emphasis added).
82 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1941)).
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has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure
of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to
this or other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or constitution of the United States.”
. . . This passage in Sibbach simply echoed what had been our
view since Wayman v. Southard, decided more than a century
earlier, where Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that
rulemaking power pertaining to the Judicial Branch may be
“conferred on the judicial department.”83
The Mistretta Court recognized, however, that while Congress may
confer “rulemaking power pertaining to the Judicial Branch . . . on the
judicial department,”84 it is an entirely different question whether Congress may confer that power on an executive agency. As the Court observed, “had Congress decided to confer responsibility for promulgating sentencing guidelines on the Executive Branch,” the resulting statute might “unconstitutionally . . . assign[] judicial responsibilities to the
Executive or unconstitutionally . . . unite[] the power to prosecute and
the power to sentence within one Branch.”85 Intelligible principles
aside, the Constitution may restrict Congress’s ability to delegate to an
executive agency the authority to curtail judicial review.86
For our discussion of reviewability doctrines, the relevant point is
that to assess nondelegation issues in a reviewability case, the court
must apply a four-pronged nondelegation doctrine. The first and second prongs are familiar. First, the court must assure itself, as usual, that
in permitting an agency to limit review by modifying the form or timing
of its action, or by establishing exhaustion procedures, Congress has
not inappropriately granted the agency true lawmaking power. Determining the appropriate form and timing of a communication with
regulated entities is plainly at least somewhat executive in nature, as is
establishing internal agency review procedures by which an agency can
double-check its own initial decisions.87 Second, also as usual, the court
must evaluate whether the statute in question provides an intelligible
83 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9–10; Wayman v. Southard, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825)); see also Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220, 242 (2005)
(expressly noting that nothing in the decision “call[s] into question any aspect of our decision in Mistretta”).
84 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted).
85 Id. at 391 n.17.
86 See id.
87 Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986) (“Interpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of the law.”).
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principle that adequately constrains the agency’s choices about form,
timing, and exhaustion. This will be a question of statutory interpretation, and may require the court to adopt a narrowing construction of
the governing laws for the reasons discussed above.88
But the inquiry cannot stop there. Rather, the court must also ask
itself whether the statute in question improperly delegates “judicial responsibilities to the Executive.”89 This third question is parallel to the
first, though in this case it turns on the judicial, rather than the legislative, nature of the delegated power. That said, just as “a certain degree
of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action,”90 a certain degree of discretion over the conduct of a case,
and thus of judicial responsibility, inheres in the prosecutorial function.91 As with delegations of quasi-legislative power, therefore, “it is up
to Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory
commands, to determine—up to a point—how small or how large”92
the agency’s judicial responsibility shall be. And, as with ordinary delegations of quasi-legislative authority, courts can ensure that Congress
never passes the elusive constitutional endpoint by again using the “intelligible principle” doctrine—the fourth prong of our expanded nondelegation inquiry—as an interpretive guide to narrow ambiguous language that might otherwise grant an agency too much authority over
the scope of judicial review.
What does all of this mean in practice? The answer is far simpler
than the above discussion would suggest. In a reviewability case, the
court should ask itself not only the usual nondelegation questions, but
also whether the relevant statute includes an adequate intelligible principle to constrain those agency choices that are relevant to reviewability,
including choices about the timing and form of the agency’s action and
the interposition of administrative review procedures.
C. Underdelegation
Assuming that the governing statute satisfies this augmented nondelegation test, the final separation of powers question is whether the
relevant statute in fact delegates to the agency the authority to limit
88 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
89 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391 n.17 (emphasis added).
90 Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91 To take just one obvious example, when the government is the plaintiff or prosecutor, it drafts the complaint and chooses (within limits) the date on which to file; thus, it
controls the timing and content of the ensuing case.
92 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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court oversight. Like nondelegation, this question raises an issue of statutory construction. Now, though, the issue is no longer whether the
Constitution permits Congress to delegate to an executive agency some
authority over court jurisdiction, but whether Congress intended to
delegate to this agency, in this context, the authority to take advantage
of jurisdictional or prudential limits on court oversight.
If Congress says, in no uncertain terms, “Agency X’s decisions are
reviewable to the extent prescribed by Agency X,” then Congress plainly
intended the agency to choose which of its decisions to shelter from review. If, on the other hand, the governing statute includes a broad judicial review provision, then the agency’s invocation of a reviewability limit
to shield agency policy choices from court oversight threatens to eviscerate the very remedy that Congress hoped would keep the agency in
check. In the latter situation, the problem is not that Congress could not
constitutionally delegate to the agency the authority to limit judicial review in the identified manner (nondelegation), but rather that Congress did not so delegate (underdelegation). Congress intended to make
review broadly available; the agency undermines that intent when it
wields the form or content of its action, or the presence of an exhaustion requirement, as a shield against court oversight.
We illustrate this concern, which we term “underdelegation,” with
a hypothetical that avoids the complexity of most real world statutes.
Suppose Congress passes a statute, the Forest Products Act, that (1)
creates a procedure for obtaining a logging permit; (2) identifies certain factual prerequisites (such as age of stand, location of stand, and
previous logging history) that any applicant must establish prior to obtaining a permit; (3) entrusts the evaluation of permit applications to a
Logging Review Board; and (4) includes a judicial review provision that
states, “Any party aggrieved by the Board’s decision granting or denying
a logging permit may, within sixty days after its entry, file a petition to
review the decision in the court of appeals wherein venue lies.”93 Suppose further that the purpose of the review provision was to ensure that
anyone aggrieved by the Board’s choices would have easy and rapid access to a judicial remedy.
Imagine next that the Logging Review Board creates an onerous
administrative reconsideration procedure under which all permit applicants and opponents must file motions to reconsider with the Board
93 This provision is styled on 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2006), which governs judicial review of
most alien removal orders. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2006) (providing that, with some exceptions, “[j]udicial review of a final order of removal . . . is governed only by [28 U.S.C.
§ 2344]”).
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before they may obtain judicial review of a permit decision. Moreover,
suppose the Board imposes a ten-day filing deadline for reconsideration motions. Finally, imagine that the Board denies a permit to a small
logging company, and the company fails to file the required reconsideration motion within the ten-day window, instead going directly to the
appropriate circuit court on day fifteen.
In this scenario, if the Logging Review Board moves to dismiss on
exhaustion grounds, and the court agrees to dismiss the challenge, the
court is effectively approving the Board’s effort to protect its permitting
decisions from review. More important for our purposes, the court is
doing so in spite of clear congressional intent to create a judicial remedy
that is broader than the Board’s ten-day limit allows. This is a paradigmatic example of underdelegation: Congress paved the way for expansive judicial review; the agency threw up procedural roadblocks that it
had no clear statutory authority to erect; and the court honored those
roadblocks, permitting the agency to exercise undelegated authority
over judicial review and, in the process, to thwart Congress’s intent.94
As this example illustrates, the problem of underdelegation is not
one of congressional power but one of congressional intent. As such,
Congress can easily overcome any underdelegation concern by being
clear about the scope of the agency’s authority. Thus, in the invented
Forest Products Act, Congress could include a fifth provision that grants
the Board the authority to “impose any administrative procedures necessary to ensure prompt, thorough, and accurate review of all logging
permit applications.” Now the Board has a plausible argument that Congress did grant it the authority to establish a reconsideration procedure
and to make exhaustion of that procedure a prerequisite for judicial
review. Specifically, the Board can argue: (1) Congress intended it to
have the opportunity to make “thorough and accurate” determinations
on all logging permit-related questions; (2) occasionally, reconsideration may be necessary to ensure both thoroughness and accuracy; and
(3) the Board must make the reconsideration procedure a prerequisite
to judicial review, because otherwise applicants would choose to forego
it. Now there is constitutional room for a court to accept that an applicant’s failure to exhaust precludes review. In this context, a court that
recognizes the jurisdictional implications of failing to exhaust the reconsideration procedure is simply deferring to the agency’s reasonable
94 Cf., e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19 (1998) (giving effect to language in the Federal Election Campaign Act that signaled “congressional intent to cast the standing net
broadly” and thus allowed for expansive judicial review of agency action).
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reading of the Forest Products Act, rather than approving the Board’s
attempt to exercise undelegated authority to evade judicial review.
Importantly, unlike Article III infringement or nondelegation,95
the problem of underdelegation can arise whether the agency’s reviewability argument is jurisdictional or prudential in nature. Under courtcreated, prudential reviewability doctrines, the courts withhold review
in certain circumstances so as not to interfere with ongoing agency policy development.96 As discussed above,97 these prudential reviewability
rules, by definition, cannot infringe the Judiciary’s protected sphere
because the courts make the rules and decide when and whether to
follow them. Likewise, these prudential rules do not pose a nondelegation problem, because the rules generally hinge on the timing and
form of the agency’s actions98—choices that are patently executive in
nature.99 But if the relevant statute indicates Congress’s intent that the
agency’s actions be broadly reviewable regardless of timing or form,
then the agency’s invocation of a prudential limit on review can infringe on Congress’s authority. Congress limited its delegation of quasilegislative power to the agency, granting the agency the power to formulate policy, but only with judicial oversight. The agency flouted that
restriction on its authority by wielding the timing and form of its action
as a shield to review. From Congress’s point of view, the fact that the
resulting shield is prudential rather than jurisdictional is irrelevant—
the agency has exceeded its statutory authority by formulating policy
without judicial oversight.
How, then, should a court assess underdelegation in a case in
which a complainant has challenged an agency’s action or policy, and
the agency has raised a reviewability objection such as inaction, finality,
ripeness, or exhaustion? The issue is one of statutory interpretation,

95 See supra notes 53–92 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 380 (distinguishing between reviewability arguments that are jurisdictional and those that are prudential in nature).
97 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
98 See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
[T]he primary focus of the ripeness doctrine as it concerns judicial review of
agency action has been a prudential attempt to time review in a way that balances the petitioner’s interest in prompt consideration of allegedly unlawful
agency action against the agency’s interest in crystallizing its policy before
that policy is subjected to judicial review and the court’s interests in avoiding
unnecessary adjudication and in deciding issues in a concrete setting.
Id.

99 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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with which courts are well acquainted.100 Three possibilities present
themselves. First, the statute could provide for judicial review of all related agency actions.101 In the face of this kind of expansive statutory
language, an agency that purports to erect a “reviewability” barrier to
court oversight is overreaching. Congress’s intent to allow for judicial
review “is clear, [and] that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress.”102
On the opposite extreme, the statute could include express language delegating to the agency the authority to delimit the scope of
judicial review. Congress has not chosen to make such an “extraordinary delegation”103 very often, but there is at least one real-world example: the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) expressly conditions review of common law claims against a foreign sovereign on the
State Department’s assessment of the sovereign’s terrorist status.104 In
other words, in the FSIA, Congress expressly delegated to the State Department the authority to make a determination that controls federal
courts’ jurisdiction to entertain certain common law claims.105 If the
relevant statute in the reviewability case accomplishes its delegation as
clearly as the FSIA, the consequence is clear: the court may give effect
to the agency’s reviewability objection (assuming there are no nondelegation, Article III infringement, or individual rights infringement problems), because the agency wields expressly delegated authority to limit
court oversight.
Finally, the third and most likely possibility is that the statute is
ambiguous. For example, the statute could contain both a judicial review provision and language that seems to grant the agency broad au100 The task of determining congressional intent based on statutory interpretation is
indeed a familiar one—courts frequently engage in such an inquiry to determine whether
a regulation should be afforded deference pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). The Chevron inquiry requires courts to discern “‘whether Congress would have intended, and expected, courts to treat [the regulation] as within, or outside, its delegation to the agency of
“gap-filling” authority.’” Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 714 (quoting Long Island Care at Home,
Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173 (2007)).
101 Interpreting the APA, for example, the Supreme Court has noted the Act’s “generous review provisions,” and accordingly has “construed [the] Act not grudgingly but as
serving a broadly remedial purpose.” Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 156 (1970) (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
102 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
103 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 840.
104 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008).
105 See id.
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thority to choose not to act, to act via nonfinal (and hence unreviewable) guidelines, to create administrative prerequisites to review, or otherwise to curtail the availability or scope of judicial review. In these
situations, the court must do what courts do best:106 try to discern the
enacting Congress’s intent, keeping in mind both the presumption in
favor of judicial review of executive action107 and the principle articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., that
courts defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions.108
Most cases, of course, will fall into this third category, because, as
“the famous hypothetical statute, ‘No vehicles shall be allowed in the
park,’”109 illustrates, statutory language is almost always subject to multiple plausible interpretations. But the fact that our suggested underdelegation analysis rarely provides a clear answer and instead requires
resort to presumptions and principles does not mean that courts
should skip the analysis altogether. As the below discussion of Ohio Forestry proves,110 in some reviewability cases, a careful reading of the statute would reveal that Congress intended to provide for broad judicial
review. In those cases, a court that nevertheless permits the agency to
invoke reviewability doctrines to evade review is sanctioning an uncon-

106 See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (“[U]nder
the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes . . . .”);
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the “proper role” of the judiciary “in construing statutes . . . is to interpret them so
as to give effect to congressional intention”); cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each.”).
107 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting that the availability of judicial review is necessary to legitimate agency action).
108 467 U.S. at 843–44.
[I]f [a] statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to [a] specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. . . . [In which case] a court may not substitute
its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
109 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1761 (2010).
110 See infra notes 176–225 and accompanying text.
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stitutional expansion of agency authority at the expense of both congressional authority111 and agency legitimacy.112
D. Individual Rights Infringement
Finally, we note that an agency’s invocation of the exhaustion doctrine or another reviewability objection could, in theory, violate the
rights of the plaintiff who is challenging his treatment at the hands of
the agency. “Article III does not confer on litigants an absolute right to
the plenary consideration of every nature of claim by an Article III
court,”113 but plainly the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,114
and perhaps also Article III itself,115 protect an individual’s right to
“make his way to court with” certain kinds of challenges to agency action.116 A court that denies review based on an agency’s inaction, finality, ripeness, or exhaustion objection could, therefore, impinge on this
right.
The first point to make about this right of access to the federal
courts is that it can be waived by the individual.117 Thus, the only relevant cases in which “individual rights infringement” could possibly arise
are those in which an agency has asked the court to curtail review, and
111 Cf. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 117 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Ngo, the majority determined
that, under the PLRA, the respondent’s failure to file an administrative grievance with
California prison officials was fatal to his attempt to file a section 1983 action against those
officials. Id. at 93–99 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens disagreed, noting that the PLRA
has “competing values”: “reducing the number of frivolous filings, on one hand, while
preserving prisoners’ capacity to file meritorious claims, on the other.” Id. at 117 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In Justice Stevens’s view, the majority’s decision to give the state’s administrative remedies jurisdictional significance “frustrate[d] rather than effectuate[d] legislative intent.” Id.
112 The agency legitimacy problem, of course, is the flip-side of the presumption in favor of judicial review: whenever an agency is permitted to escape judicial review, there is a
concern that the precluded claim may have been meritorious. See, e.g., id. (discussing the
need to “preserve prisoners’ capacity to file meritorious claims” against prison officials);
supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
113 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (citing
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985)); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
114 U.S. Const. amend. V.
115 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
116 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (observing that a U.S. citizen is entitled to “make his way to
court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his Government,” even if
that citizen is detained as an enemy combatant).
117 Schor, 478 U.S. at 848–49 (“[A]s a personal right, Article III’s guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal
constitutional rights that dictate the procedures by which civil and criminal matters must
be tried.”).
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the individual claimant has argued that denying review would infringe
his due process (or Article III) rights.118 In such a case, the court must
assess whether delaying, abridging, or denying review would, in fact,
violate those rights.
The remainder of this article focuses on cases that implicate structural separation of powers issues rather than due process, so we summarize only briefly the due process analysis.119 Due process is generally
understood to be “flexible” and situation-dependent,120 in essence requiring the government to provide certain procedural safeguards—
such as notice and a hearing121—before (or sometimes after)122 depriving a “person” of “life, liberty, or property.”123 The inquiry proceeds in
two parts. First, the injured party must have a life, liberty, or property
interest at stake. Of these interests, reviewability cases most often implicate liberty. The paradigmatic fact pattern is that of a litigant (usually a
prisoner, illegal immigrant, or asylum seeker) who seeks to challenge
an agency’s handling of himself or his case but is barred from proceed118 See id.
119 For a more thorough discussion of the role of due process in constraining agency action, see Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process in the Administrative
State, 46 Ga. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1786669.
120 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
121 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“This Court consistently has held
that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property
interest.”); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) (“The failure to accord an accused a
fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process.”); Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity
to be heard.”).
122 See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349 (holding that a pre-deprivation hearing is not required
prior to terminating the plaintiff’s social security disability benefits); see also Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“‘The hearing must be ‘at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies,
93 Colum. L. Rev. 309, 330 (1993).
Under the Due Process Clause, government must typically provide notice and
some kind of hearing before it can lawfully deprive anyone of life, liberty, or
property. Moreover, when pre-deprivation process is not extensive—as it need
not be, for example, before someone may be deprived of government employment—a fuller hearing must generally be provided before a temporary
deprivation becomes final.
Fallon, supra, at 330 (footnotes omitted).
123 U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332 (“Procedural due process
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or
‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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ing in court because of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.124
The exact contours of the liberty interest are unclear, but as a general
rule, the term is broadly defined,125 extending not only to freedom
from confinement by the government but also to “protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights” and to enjoyment of those “privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”126
Assuming an individual successfully demonstrates that a challenged agency action will deprive him of a life, liberty, or property interest, the second part of the inquiry requires the court to assess
whether any process the individual received “satisf[ies] the dictates of
minimal due process.”127 To make this assessment, the court must balance “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”;
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used”; and “the Government’s interest.”128 As a practical matter, administrative hearings often satisfy this three-factor test.129 Thus,
the individual may have no right of access to the federal courts. Moreover, many reviewability cases involve finality or ripeness objections in

124 See, e.g., Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93.
125 See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (“In a Constitution for a free
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of ‘liberty’ must be broad indeed.”). Although the Court has referred to “liberty” and “property” as “broad and majestic terms,”
they are not limitless. Id. at 571–75. For example, the Court has found no liberty or property interest at stake in at-will public employment, in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 343–50
(1976); “reputation alone,” in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709–12 (1976); foster family
challenges to removal of foster children to natural parents, in Smith v. Org. of Foster Families
for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846–47 (1977); and state prison regulations that are not
“atypical” and do not impose a “significant deprivation,” in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
485–86 (1995) (“[Defendant’s] discipline in segregated confinement did not present the
type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty
interest.”).
126 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 727 n.19 (1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 517 (1990).
128 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
129 See, e.g., id. at 349.
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which the agency asks the court not to bar but merely to delay review.130
The plaintiff in such a case would be hard pressed to argue that the
resulting delay so threatens her private interests as to deprive her of
due process.131 Thus, it will be the rare case in which an agency’s reviewability objection and a court’s consequent curtailment of review
implicate an individual plaintiff’s due process rights.132
II. Applying the Rubric
Each of the four concerns discussed above—Article III infringement, nondelegation, underdelegation, and individual rights infringement—serves as an essential check on agency authority to curtail federal court jurisdiction or otherwise to limit judicial oversight. As noted
above, however, courts do not systematically evaluate these concerns in
cases in which an agency argues that its choices have consequences for
the scope of review. Rather, courts tend to focus narrowly on whichever
reviewability doctrine applies in the particular case.
We therefore revisit three reviewability cases that implicate our rubric: two from the Supreme Court—the 2004 case Norton v. Southern
Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA),133 and the 1998 case Ohio Forestry Ass’n
v. Sierra Club134—and one from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit, the 2011 case Amador County v. Salazar.135 Our analysis suggests
that standard reviewability analyses systematically undervalue at least
one of the constitutional concerns we identify: underdelegation. That
is, those analyses fail to account for the very real possibility that Congress did not intend for the agency to have the authority to wield the
130 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 20, Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. 726 (No. 97-16) (arguing
that forest management plans would not “forever escape review” because aspects of the
plans would be ripe for review “[o]nce a timber sale creates the concrete factual context
required for a manageable ripe controversy”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131 “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552). Thus, delaying review of a nonfinal agency decision until that decision actually deprives the plaintiff of some concrete liberty or property interest would
likely satisfy the flexible requirements of the Due Process Clause.
132 But see Ngo, 548 U.S. at 117–18, 121–23 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the Court’s imposition of “procedural default sanction” on a prisoner who
“fails, inter alia, to file her grievance (perhaps because she correctly fears retaliation) within strict time requirements that are generally no more than 15 days” may “cause the statute
to be vulnerable to constitutional challenges” because “the Constitution guarantees that
prisoners, like all citizens, have a reasonably adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
claims before impartial judges.” Id.
133 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004).
134 523 U.S. 726, 728–32 (1998).
135 640 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

1714

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 52:1687

timing or form of its action, or the existence of an administrative review
procedure, as a shield against court oversight.
A. SUWA: The BLM Dodges Judicial Review, but Remains
Within Constitutional Limits
SUWA concerned the Bureau of Land Management’s (BLM) handling of so-called “wilderness study areas” (“WSAs”) in Southern
Utah.136 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) requires the BLM to manage WSAs “in a manner so as not to impair the
suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness”137 and “in accordance with . . . land use plans . . . when they are available.”138 SUWA and
several other environmental groups alleged that the BLM violated the
FLPMA’s requirements by failing to protect the Southern Utah WSAs
from environmental harms caused by off-road vehicle use.139
The question before the Court in SUWA was whether section
706(1) of the APA, which empowers courts to “compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”140 authorized the court
to review the BLM’s “failure to act to protect public lands in Utah from
damage caused by [off-road vehicle] use”141—that is, whether the
BLM’s failure to act in this context constituted action “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” within the meaning of the APA. The
Court concluded that the FLPMA does not mandate the kind of concrete actions that courts can “compel” under section 706(1).142 In practical terms, the decision means that courts lack authority under the
APA to review the BLM’s failure to take action against at least some
harmful land use practices in WSAs.

136 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59.
137 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2006).
138 Id. § 1732(a).
139 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 60–61.
140 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
141 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 61. In managing public lands, the Secretary of the Interior,
through the BLM, must, by regulation or otherwise, “take any action required to prevent
unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and their resources or to afford environmental protection.” 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c). The BLM uses land management plans to balance
environmental protection against other land uses. See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59. Land use
plans, which the BLM adopts after notice and comment, are “designed to guide and control future management actions.” 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-2 (2010); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1712;
SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59. A “land use plan describes, for a particular area, allowable uses,
goals for future condition of the land, and specific next steps.” SUWA, 542 U.S. at 59 (citing 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(k)).
142 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 66.
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The Court reached this conclusion by narrowly interpreting APA
section 706(1) to extend only to cases in which “an agency failed to take
a discrete agency action that it is required to take.”143 The Court then held
that although the WSA preservation requirement is “mandatory as to
the object to be achieved,” it “leaves [the] BLM a great deal of discretion in deciding how to achieve” that object.144 As for the land use plans
that the BLM had developed for the Southern Utah WSAs, the Court
observed that the FLPMA precludes the agency from taking affirmative
“actions inconsistent with the [plans’] provisions.”145 The Court made
clear, however, that the plans’ statements about future agency action—
such as the statement in one plan that a particularly vulnerable area
would “be monitored and closed [to off-road vehicle use] if warranted”146—were merely “‘will do’ projections of agency action,” not
binding and enforceable commitments.147 The Court therefore concluded that neither the FLPMA nor the Southern Utah land management plans require discrete agency actions with respect to off-road vehicles and consequently, the agency’s failure to take any such action is
immune from review under APA section 706(1).148
For our purposes, it is important first to note that the BLM’s failure to prohibit off-road vehicle use in the Southern Utah WSAs had the
same practical effect as a regulation affirmatively permitting the activity: off-road vehicle use is permitted in the WSAs. By proceeding via
inaction, however, the BLM shielded its decision from judicial review.
An affirmative decision to allow off-road vehicles could have been reviewed for consistency with the FLPMA under APA section 706(2),149
whereas the decision not to disallow off-road vehicles lies outside the
scope of section 706(1).150 For all practical purposes, therefore, this is a
case in which an agency made a decision about off-road vehicle use and
then, deliberately or otherwise, “shelter[ed] its own decision[] from
abuse-of-discretion appellate court” oversight.151

143 Id. at 64.
144 Id. at 66.
145 Id. at 69.
146 Id. at 68. (internal quotation marks omitted).
147 Id. at 72.
148 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72.
149 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall—(2) hold unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— . . . (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right . . . .”).
150 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72.
151 Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 840 (2010).
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The outcome in SUWA thus sends a peculiar message to the BLM:
if you choose to permit a particular activity in wilderness study areas,
implement that policy choice by declining to regulate the activity—a
course of (in)action that cannot be second-guessed by courts. Moreover, if you write a management plan for a WSA, make sure that plan is
strategic and aspirational, and makes no binding commitments to future action.152 Indeed, SUWA sends that message to all agencies, not
just those that manage federal lands. As long as an agency’s inaction
does not amount to a “fail[ure] to take a discrete . . . required . . . action,”
the policy choices underlying that inaction remain unreviewable. 153
SUWA’s message is peculiar for two reasons. First, as already noted,
the decision provides agencies with a roadmap for achieving certain
concrete regulatory outcomes (such as permitting off-road vehicle use)
with minimal court oversight. The second peculiarity, though, is more
insidious. The very legitimacy of administrative regulation hinges on
public participation,154 yet SUWA encourages agencies to implement
their choices via inaction where possible, thereby not only evading
court review but also eliminating any opportunity for the public to hear
about and attempt to influence those choices.155
Although the APA analysis in SUWA is quite thorough, the Court
never squarely addresses the questions we raise here—namely, whether
the BLM’s objection to APA review inappropriately aggrandized agency
power at the expense of Congress, the courts, or the objects of regulation. Addressing those issues is critical, we submit, to deciding agency
inaction cases like SUWA.
We begin the discussion by applying our four-part rubric. As discussed below, we ultimately agree with the Court’s opinion—nothing in
the Constitution, we conclude, obligated the SUWA Court to address
152 Indeed, in 2005, the Forest Service made this new approach explicit, issuing a postSUWA rule that “emphasize[s] the ‘strategic’ nature of land management plans,” which
from 2005 on will “authorize no specific projects, merely ‘characteriz[e]’ future conditions
and provid[e] ‘guidance’ for future decisions.” Michael C. Blumm & Sherry L. Bosse, Norton v. SUWA and the Unraveling of Federal Public Land Planning, 18 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y
F. 105, 111 (2007) (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 219 (2010)).
153 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64.
154 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (requiring public notice-and-comment prior to
adopting regulations); Blumm & Bosse, supra note 152, at 108 (noting that FLPMA “reflect[s] a federal commitment to public involvement, congressional oversight, and longrange planning as the central tenets of public land decision making”).
155 See Blumm & Bosse, supra note 152, at 106 (arguing that “Congress created modern
federal land planning as the cornerstone of greater public involvement in public land
decision making,” but SUWA “and its aftermath have destroyed that vision, making public
land plans virtually irrelevant and a large waste of taxpayer dollars”).
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the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.156 In this and many other reviewability cases, our rubric leads to the same outcome as the standard reviewability analysis. That fact does not, however, undermine the importance of the rubric. Our aim is not to obligate courts to hear a significantly larger percentage of cases challenging agency action, but rather
to ensure that agencies cannot manipulate courts into declining review
in that small subset of inaction, finality, exhaustion, or ripeness cases in
which a decision to delay or deny review would undermine the agency’s
constitutional legitimacy or infringe the parties’ rights.
On the facts of SUWA, we can dispense quickly with two of the four
prongs of our rubric—Article III and individual rights infringement.
First, even assuming that Article III protects an inner sphere of court
jurisdiction, review of agency inaction certainly falls outside that sphere.
Court review of agency inaction is not necessary to preserve the Supreme Court’s “essential role” of maintaining the supremacy and uniformity of federal law.157 Nor is court review necessary to protect the
due process rights of the plaintiff in an inaction suit,158 who (by definition) raises the third-party harm of a regulatory beneficiary rather than
the first-party harm of a regulatory object (no regulatory object would
think to complain of the absence of regulation).159 Thus, the BLM’s assertion that its decision not to regulate off-road vehicle use is unreviewable does not unconstitutionally infringe on the power of the courts.
Second, and relatedly, nothing in the SUWA decision raises due
process concerns. Neither SUWA nor the other environmental group
156 See infra notes 158–175 and accompanying text. See generally Bressman, supra note
14, at 1709–10 (similarly concluding that SUWA was rightly decided, though suggesting
that the Court did not pay adequate attention to the potential for agency arbitrariness
implicit in every decision not to act).
157 Hart, supra note 60, at 1364–65; see also Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over
the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 161 (1960).
158 See Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
17, 66 (1981).
159 Cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992).
When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be . . . proved . . . to establish
standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object
of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little
question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however, . . . a
plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful
regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.
Id.
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plaintiffs have liberty or property interests in the management of the
Southern Utah WSAs that comprise only public lands.160
Applying the nondelegation prong of our rubric to SUWA is somewhat trickier. We must assess whether Congress could constitutionally
delegate to the BLM the discretion to implement land management decisions through inaction. As we have noted, this question has four subparts: (1) whether Congress improperly delegated true lawmaking power; (2) whether the FLPMA provides an intelligible principle to constrain the BLM’s discretion in making its substantive land management
choices; (3) whether, in allowing for the possibility of unreviewable
agency inaction, the FLPMA improperly delegated judicial responsibilities to the Executive; and (4) whether the FLPMA provides an intelligible principle to constrain the BLM’s discretion in making choices—like
the choice not to act—that have implications for the scope of judicial
review.161
The first two questions have straightforward answers. This type of
agency discretion—the freedom to choose how to achieve a particular
statutory objective—lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s functional
nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence. That jurisprudence permits
flexibility and encourages interbranch coordination to cope with increasingly complex regulatory structures and ever-changing circumstances.162 True, Congress must lay down an intelligible principle to
160 See supra notes 113–132 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
162 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[O]ur [nondelegation
doctrine] jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
The legislative process would frequently bog down if Congress were constitutionally required to appraise before-hand the myriad situations to which it
wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for
each situation. Necessity therefore fixes a point beyond which it is unreasonable and impracticable to compel Congress to prescribe detailed rules; it then
becomes constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general
policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.
Am. Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 105; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935)
(“The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function . . . .”);
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (“In determining what
[Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of
that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of
the governmental co-ordination.”).
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guide and confine the agency’s discretion in achieving the statutory
objective, but the FLPMA easily satisfies that test: section 1782(c) of the
Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to exercise his discretion in a
manner that “prevent[s] unnecessary or undue degradation of the
lands and their resources” and does “not . . . impair the suitability of
[the WSAs] for preservation as wilderness.”163 These guidelines easily
meet the Court’s permissive definition of “intelligible principle.”164
The third subpart of our nondelegation analysis leads us into lesscharted waters. In the FLPMA, Congress delegated to the BLM the discretion to manage WSAs in a manner that does not impair their suitability for preservation.165 That discretion must encompass the freedom not to act, as the BLM must at minimum have authority to decide
which of various threatening land use practices deserves its immediate
regulatory attention, and which can be monitored for a time until their
consequences are better understood.
Yet the BLM’s decision not to regulate affects more than the management of the WSAs; as seen in SUWA, the decision also has implications for the scope of review.166 Whether Congress can expressly delegate this type of jurisdiction-altering discretion is unclear. We submit,
however, that in this case the BLM’s exercise of authority over the scope
of court review is unproblematic because it is entirely ancillary to the
execution of Congress’s nonimpairment mandate,167 and the execution
of that mandate is adequately constrained by the intelligible principles
identified above. In other words, in SUWA the BLM did not choose a
form of action (namely inaction) primarily for the purpose of curtailing court review. Rather, in exercising its legitimately granted and
properly constrained authority over the management of public lands,
the BLM chose not to take action with respect to off-road vehicle use,
and that choice then had ramifications for the scope of review— ramifications that SUWA and the other plaintiffs undoubtedly lament, but
that raise no nondelegation issue.
That brings us to the underdelegation question in SUWA, which is
the heart of our analysis. Underdelegation turns on whether Congress
163 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2006).
164 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2000); see also supra notes
70–71 and accompanying text.
165 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).
166 See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64.
167 Cf. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that agency lawmaking,
which is ancillary to execution of laws, does not violate the nondelegation doctrine because a certain amount of lawmaking inheres in the power to execute).
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intended to give the BLM discretion to choose an unreviewable form of
action in implementing the FLPMA. If Congress did not intend to give
the BLM such discretion, then there is a clear underdelegation problem. If, on the other hand, Congress intended, even implicitly, to give
the BLM the freedom to decide how to achieve the statutory goals set
by Congress, including the freedom to achieve those goals via inaction,
then there is no underdelegation issue.
The language of the FLPMA leads us to the latter conclusion. First,
the Act gives the BLM considerable discretion about how to achieve its
goals: “in managing the public lands the Secretary shall by regulation or
otherwise take any action required to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and their resources or to afford environmental
protection.”168 This broad language leaves the BLM with room to decide
both whether an action is required and, if so, whether to act “by regulation or otherwise.”169 Second, nothing in the FLPMA itself envisions
broad judicial review of land management decisions—rather, plaintiffs
must turn to the APA to challenge BLM actions.170 That is, the FLPMA
does not include the sort of expansive judicial review provisions that
might lead a court to conclude that Congress did not intend to grant
the agency authority to shield its choices from outside oversight.171 Finally, by limiting judicial review of agency inaction to cases “where a
plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete action that it is required to take,”172 the APA itself buttresses the conclusion that Congress
intended agencies like FLPMA to have the freedom to decline to act.173
In short, because the FLPMA provides no express direction to the
BLM to accomplish any specific task in any particular manner, Congress
is fairly deemed to have delegated the details of implementation to the
BLM.174 This includes the authority not to take certain actions, even if
those actions would arguably help achieve Congress’s goals.175 And, in
168 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (emphasis added).
169 Id.
170 See id.
171 See id.; see also supra notes 80–92 and accompanying text.
172 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64–65.
173 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2006).
174 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2006).
175 See SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63–65; cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984)); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch
Problem, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 831, 870 (2001).
If Congress has not spoken clearly about how it wishes the law to be administered, it falls by default to the Executive—ordinarily in the form of an admin-
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turn, the authority not to act necessarily encompasses the subsidiary
authority to shield some implementation decisions from judicial review
by choosing not to act.
In sum, although we question the wisdom of the message that SUWA sends to land use planners for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that neither separation of powers nor due process concerns required the Court to reach the merits of SUWA’s claims. Thus, the Court
reached a constitutionally sound outcome even as it acquiesced in what
could well have been a strategic attempt by the BLM to achieve a regulatory outcome (continued off-road vehicle use in WSAs) without court
oversight.
B. Ohio Forestry: The U.S. Forest Service’s Ripeness Argument
Betrays Congressional Intent
We reach a different conclusion, however, in Ohio Forestry.176 In
that case, the U.S. Forest Service successfully wielded the ripeness doctrine to shield from judicial review a final, ten-year Land and Resource
Management Plan (“Plan”) for Ohio’s Wayne National Forest.177 Required by the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), forest plans
like the one at issue in Ohio Forestry are used to “guide all natural resource management activities” within the covered forest.178 They prescribe the total amount of logging that may take place in the forest, the
location of that logging, and the type of harvesting that may be employed, though they do not authorize any particular logging activity.179
The Wayne National Forest Plan, for example, allowed for logging on
126,000 of the forest’s 178,000 acres, and capped the total amount of
timber that could be taken off the land at roughly 75,000,000 board
feet.180 The Plan estimated that within ten years logging would take
place on roughly 8000 acres, 5000 of which would be subject to “‘clearcutting’” —the “indiscriminate and complete shaving from the earth of
istrative agency—to make the policy choices necessary to giving concrete content to the law. . . . It is perfectly consistent with the Constitution for the President to exercise that power, because Article II devolves upon him not only
the duty but also the power to execute the laws. That is the theory, at least, of
Chevron.
Kelley, supra, at 870.
176 523 U.S. at 729–30.
177 Id.
178 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b) (2010).
179 See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 729–30.
180 Id. at 729.
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all trees—regardless of size or age—often across hundreds of contiguous acres.”181 The Plan did not authorize specific logging projects, but
it plainly “ma[de] logging more likely” because without the Plan no
tree could be cut.182
As encouraged by the NFMA, the Sierra Club and the Citizens
Council on Conservation and Environmental Control (together “the
Club”) participated in all public phases of Plan development.183 At the
end of the day, however, the Club objected to the Plan’s contents and
filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
asserting that “erroneous analysis le[d] the Plan wrongly to favor logging and clearcutting.”184 The Club lost on the merits before the district court but prevailed on appeal to the Sixth Circuit.185
When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the Court
unanimously concluded that the Plan was not ripe for judicial review.186
The Court applied the traditional ripeness test, which focuses on the
“‘fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and the ‘hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’”187 In the Court’s view, delaying judicial review would not prejudice the Sierra Club, whereas immediate review would interfere with the Forest Service’s statutory prerogative to amend its overarching logging plan before allowing any
particular logging project to go forward.188 Finally, the Court noted
that considerations of efficient judicial administration counseled in favor of delaying review to permit the controversy to develop into a more
concrete dispute about particular stands of trees.189
The Court did acknowledge two “exceptions to the traditional
ripeness analysis [that] embody a deference to the legislative process”:
situations in which Congress either (1) provided expressly for preimplementation review of agency rules, or (2) prescribed a procedure
“the violation of which creates an immediate cause of action.”190 (An
example of the latter is the environmental review process required un181 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 749 n.7 (1972).
182 Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 730.
183 Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 252 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. 726.
184 Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 731.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 728–32.
187 Id. at 733 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
188 Id.
189 Id.; see also Amanda C. Cohen, Ripeness Revisited: The Implications of Ohio Forestry Association, Inc. v. Sierra Club for Environmental Litigation, 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 547, 551–
53 (1999) (detailing the Court’s analysis).
190 Cohen, supra note 189, at 554; see also Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737.
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der the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).)191 In the Court’s
view, however, neither exception applied to the Sierra Club’s challenge
to the Wayne National Forest Plan, because (1) Congress did not expressly provide that forest plans be reviewable prior to implementation,
and (2) the Club took issue with the Wayne Plan itself, rather than the
Service’s failure to comply with a NEPA-like procedural requirement.192
Like SUWA, Ohio Forestry creates perverse incentives for managers
of public lands. There are many benefits to a system that mandates a
rigorous, highly specific, and comprehensive planning phase prior to
any “public land decision making.”193 For example:
The planning process attracts public attention when the focus
of land management is on the resources an area possesses, not
on the merits of a particular project. Without a project and its
momentum, agency personnel are in a posture of unbiased
managers rather than project proponents. Moreover, at the
planning stage, with an areawide concentration and a focus
on land resources, the cumulative effects of various potential
resource developments can be evaluated without pressure
from project sponsors. The planning process, in short, can
encourage rational decision making in advance of specific
land use decisions[] . . . [and] produce predictability . . . .194
The Ohio Forestry decision ignores these benefits, turning the planning
process into an unreviewable procedural hurdle to be cleared— agencies must comply with the letter of NFMA’s planning requirement, but
the decision gives them free reign to ignore the provision’s spirit without risk of judicial reprimand.195
What is even more insidious is that, while Ohio Forestry no doubt
dissuades agencies from making any firm and specific—and hence reviewable—commitments in their otherwise unenforceable land management plans, the decision simultaneously gives agencies every incentive to fill planning documents with as many overarching and nonspecific management choices as possible.196 By doing so, agencies are able
191 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
192 See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737 (“Congress has not provided for preimplementation judicial review of forest plans.”).
193 Blumm & Bosse, supra note 152, at 159.
194 Id.
195 See Cohen, supra note 189, at 557 (critiquing the Ohio Forestry decision).
196 See id. at 557–58.
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to entrench their choices at a point at which judicial review is not yet
available.197 True, no trees fall as a result of these management decisions; for forests, the plans typically set broad timber cutting goals and
block out areas that will be open or closed to logging. Forest plans do
have real world significance, though, because they determine routes for
logging roads and other resource-allocation issues that have concrete
implications for subsequent decisions about which trees to cut and
when and where to cut them.198 Although courts may later have an opportunity to review individual logging permits, they are unlikely to have
an opportunity to revisit these early and broad resource-allocation
choices.199 It is therefore critical to ask whether allowing the Forest Service to wield the ripeness doctrine as a shield to judicial review of its
management plans comports with the structure of checks and balances
that Congress built into the NFMA.
As with SUWA, we begin our analysis with a brief discussion of Article III and individual rights infringement.200 Like the FLPMA, the
NFMA implicates no Article III infringement concerns. In Ohio Forestry,
the Supreme Court chose not to review the Forest Service’s land management plan after considering the interests of the parties, the agency,
and the courts.201 The Court did not expressly indicate whether that balancing test was constitutionally required or instead more prudential in
origin, but regardless, a balancing test that expressly weighs the interests of the courts mitigates concerns about executive encroachment on
the judicial sphere.202 Likewise, precluding judicial review of the Plan
did not violate Sierra Club’s due process rights because, as in SUWA,
the stakeholders in Ohio Forestry lacked any liberty or property interest
in the management of the Wayne National Forest.203
The nondelegation analysis again proves more complicated. In
Ohio Forestry, the question is whether Congress could constitutionally
delegate to the Forest Service the discretion to implement forest management decisions through unreviewable planning documents.204 We
begin with the first two subparts of our nondelegation rubric—(1)
whether the NFMA impermissibly delegates lawmaking power, and (2)
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See supra notes 157–160 and accompanying text.
201 Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733.
202 See id.
203 See id.
204 See Cohen, supra note 189, at 557.
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whether it provides an intelligible principle to limit the Service’s forest
management decisions. These two questions pose no difficulty. First,
the detailed management choices laid out in the Plan for the Wayne
National Forest fall comfortably within the range of executive powers
embraced by the Court’s functional nondelegation doctrine.205 In addition, the Forest Service, unlike Congress, has both the bandwidth and
expertise to regulate federal land use through planning statements.206
Further, the NFMA provides intelligible principles that properly limit
the Forest Service’s authority to oversee federal lands through land and
resource management plans. For example, the Act supplies detailed
requirements regarding the criteria the Service may use in developing
the plans, the degree of public participation required, and the manner
in which the plans must be reviewed and revised.207
Next, we must ask whether the NFMA improperly delegates judicial responsibilities to the executive, and whether it properly constrains
any agency choices that have ramifications for the scope of judicial review. It must be acknowledged up front that, by leaving room for the
Forest Service to implement management decisions via unreviewable
planning documents,208 Congress delegated to the Service some power
over the timing of review of substantive land use choices—a power that
is plainly judicial in nature. That said, we nevertheless conclude that
Congress did not impermissibly delegate judicial responsibility to the
Forest Service, and that the NFMA adequately constrains the Forest
Service’s choices about when to proceed via an unreviewable planning
document. The NFMA directs the Forest Service to begin its land use
planning by writing overarching management plans for each forest.209
The jurisdictional consequences follow from the nature of planning
documents that anticipate logging but do not actually “authorize the
cutting of any trees.”210 In other words, Congress has constrained the
agency’s choice of form, giving the Forest Service little or no ability to
manipulate the ripeness doctrine to evade judicial review.211 Therefore,
the NFMA poses no nondelegation problem.
205 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372; see also supra note 163 and accompanying text.
206 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
207 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006).
208 See id. § 1604(a) (instructing the Secretary of Agriculture to “develop, maintain,
and, as appropriate, revise land and resource management plans for units of the National
Forest System”) (emphasis added).
209 See id. § 1604.
210 Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 729.
211 See id.
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That brings us, finally, to the underdelegation prong of our test. It
is here that we begin to see the risk of unthinking application of standard reviewability doctrines. The Ohio Forestry Court’s application of the
ripeness doctrine properly considered the interests of the parties, the
agency, and the court.212 At no point, though, did the Court consider
whether Congress intended the Forest Service to have the ability to
shield some of its substantive policy choices from judicial review by ensconcing those choices in the required forest plans.213 True, the Court
noted that Congress could have expressly provided for preimplementation review of those plans.214 But placing the onus on Congress to provide for preimplementation review reverses the usual presumption.215
As we noted earlier, in other circumstances, the Court has been quite
adamant that ambiguous statutory language should not be read to delegate to an agency the authority to shield its substantive decisions from
review.216 Yet the Ohio Forestry Court read the absence of preimplementation language in the NFMA to do just that—to delegate to the Forest
Service the authority to shield its substantive planning choices from
review by including them in a document that makes important policy
choices about the location, amount, and timing of logging but does not
yet allow any trees to be cut.217
Had the Court recognized the need to consider congressional intent before denying review, it might well have concluded that Congress
intended to allow for preimplementation review of forest management
plans. For example, the NFMA expressly requires the Forest Service to
“provide for public participation in the development, review, and revision of

212 See id. at 733.
213 See Cohen, supra note 189, at 556–61 (describing the curious regulatory regime endorsed, at least implicitly, by the Court in Ohio Forestry, under which agencies may “implement in discrete steps a plan that would likely have been deemed arbitrary or capricious if
reviewed as a whole”; as a practical matter, this outcome may “undermine the environmental planning process, because a court may be unable to review an unreasonable management plan until after the majority of the plan has already been implemented in discrete, often irreversible, steps”).
214 Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737.
215 On at least one other occasion, the Court has also indicated that the ripeness analysis could be altered if Congress expressly provided for preimplementation review. In Lujan,
the Court noted that “[s]ome statutes permit broad regulations to serve as the ‘agency
action,’ and thus to be the object of judicial review directly, even before the concrete effects normally required for APA review are felt.” 497 U.S. at 891. As in Ohio Forestry, the
default rule from Lujan is that an agency’s broad policy documents are not reviewable unless Congress expressly provided for preimplementation review. See id.
216 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 839–40; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
217 See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737.

2011]

What Agencies Can (and Can't) Do to Limit Judicial Review

1727

land management plans”218 and to “appoint a committee of scientists
who are not officers or employees of the Forest Service” to “provide scientific and technical advice and counsel on proposed guidelines and
procedures to assure that an effective interdisciplinary approach is proposed and adopted.”219 It stands to reason, then, that Congress may have
intended those stakeholders to be able to challenge the plans in federal
court: Congress’s emphasis on collaboration and public accountability
with respect to the development, review, and revision of forest management plans evinces its intent to make those plans judicially enforceable.
In other words, the text of the NFMA suggests that Congress intended to
give stakeholders a right of judicial review, not to grant the Forest Service the power to curtail review by acting via unenforceable planning
documents.220
There is room for disagreement on this point. A court could reasonably conclude that Congress did not intend to allow for preimplementation judicial review of forest plans. Our argument does not hinge
on the outcome of this analysis of congressional purpose. Rather, we
seek only to emphasize that in reviewability cases, as in statutory interpretation cases, “[s]eparation-of-powers concerns . . . caution . . . against
reading legislation, absent clear statement, to place in executive hands
authority to remove cases from the Judiciary’s domain.”221 To effectuate
this principle in the ripeness context, courts should presume that important agency planning documents are ripe for review as soon as they
are drafted, unless Congress has specifically instructed the courts not to
review such measures prior to enforcement. Changing the ripeness
analysis in this way would not dramatically expand the category of reviewable agency actions, but it would better ensure that courts do not
unwittingly allow agencies to shield from court oversight policy choices
that Congress intended to be reviewable. Reasonable minds may disagree over the correct reading of the NFMA, but whatever one’s views
about that particular statute, application of our rubric would force
courts to face head-on the important question of underdelegation.
The point is important enough to restate in different terms. In Ohio
Forestry, the Court adopted a flawed default rule of reviewability: no preimplementation review unless Congress has expressly authorized such
review (or has created actionable procedural safeguards).222 As the
218 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
219 Id. § 1604(h)(1) (emphasis added).
220 See id.
221 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 831.
222 Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737 (citing Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891).
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Court recognized in Kucana, however, “plac[ing] in executive hands authority to remove cases from the Judiciary’s domain” is an “extraordinary delegation.”223 Consistent with the traditional “presumption favoring interpretations of statutes [to] allow judicial review of administrative
action,”224 courts should not read statutes to accomplish such a delegation “absent a clear statement” from Congress.225 In the absence of a
clear statement, then, courts should presume that an agency lacks the
authority to shield its policy choices from judicial review by imbedding
those choices in preliminary and hence unripe planning documents.
Our rubric, applied in conjunction with the traditional ripeness
analysis, solves this problem by forcing courts to address the possibility
that Congress intended, albeit implicitly, to allow immediate judicial
review of certain agency actions. In such a case, any attempt by an
agency to curtail review by wielding the ripeness doctrine as a shield
should be considered an improper encroachment on Congress’s constitutional prerogative to define and confine agency authority.
C. Amador County: The D.C. Circuit Recognizes the
Problem of Underdelegation
Finally, we turn to the Amador County case,226 in which the court
considered the reviewability of the Secretary of the Interior’s so-called
“‘no-action’ approval” of a gaming compact between the Buena Vista
Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians and the State of California.227 The court
concluded that the approval was reviewable,228 so we need not proceed
through our four-part rubric to the assess separation of powers and due
process implications of a counterfactual decision to curtail review. The
decision is nevertheless relevant to this discussion because the court
appears to have been concerned about the issue we call “underdelegation” —that is, the absence of any statutory authority for the agency to
hide behind reviewability objections—yet the opinion itself is somewhat
opaque on this point.229 The case therefore illustrates our dual claims,
first that courts sometimes reach out to review ostensibly unreviewable
agency actions out of concern about agency overreaching, and second
that our rubric would provide a sounder footing for such opinions.
223 Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 831.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 640 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
227 Id. at 375.
228 Id.
229 See id. at 379–83.
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Some background is necessary to understand the reviewability issue in Amador County. As its name suggests, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)230 regulates gaming on tribal lands.231 As relevant to
Amador County, IGRA requires, among other things, that the gaming
take place on “Indian lands,” and that it “be conducted in conformance
with a tribal-state compact that has been approved by the Secretary” of
the Interior.232 The Secretary may expressly approve the compact, or
may implicitly approve it by “do[ing] nothing, in which case the compact is deemed approved after forty-five days ‘but only to the extent the
compact is consistent with the provisions’ of IGRA.”233 Alternatively, the
Secretary may disapprove the compact, “but only if it violates IGRA[,]
other federal law,” or other federal obligations.234
In Amador County, the Secretary approved, by inaction, an amended
compact between the Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians and
the State of California.235 That is, the Secretary did not act on the
Tribe’s request for compact approval within forty-five days, and he subsequently published a notice of approval in the Federal Register in accordance with IGRA.236 Amador County then sued the Secretary alleging that the compact violated IGRA because it did not meet the Act’s
“Indian lands” requirement.237
The Secretary argued that the County’s claims were unreviewable
for a variety of reasons, only one of which is relevant here: that the noaction-approval was not a reviewable agency action under APA section
706(1).238 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia did not
reach this issue because it found the no-action approval unreviewable
for other reasons.239 The D.C. Circuit, though, relied on the structure
of IGRA240 and the “strong presumption that Congress intends agency
action to be reviewable”241 to find the approval reviewable.
The standard for deciding whether agency inaction is reviewable
derives, of course, from SUWA: inaction is reviewable under APA sec230 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2702 (2006).
231 Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 376.
232 Id.
233 Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(C)).
234 Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(B)).
235 Id. at 377.
236 Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(D).
237 Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 377.
238 Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 704.
239 Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 377.
240 Id. at 380.
241 Id.
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tion 706(1) only when “an agency failed to take a discrete agency action
that it is required to take.” 242 The question for the Amador County court,
therefore, was whether “approval of the Me-Wuk compact through inaction fails [the] discreteness requirement” of SUWA.243
In assessing this issue, the court focused on the fact that the IGRA
limits the Secretary’s authority to approve a compact by inaction. Specifically, “compacts deemed approved through secretarial inaction become effective ‘only to the extent the compact is consistent with the
provisions of [IGRA].’”244 As a direct consequence of this limit on noaction-approvals, the court continued, the Secretary of the Interior has
“an obligation . . . to affirmatively disapprove any compact” that violates
IGRA.245 That obligation, in turn, means that when someone challenges an approved compact as violating IGRA, the court has “a discrete agency inaction to review—the . . . failure to disapprove the compact despite its [alleged] inconsistency with the Act.”246
While internally consistent, this reasoning is too acrobatic to be
particularly compelling, working backwards as it does from an affirmative limit on no-action-approvals to an implicit agency failure to decide
not to disapprove. Far more compelling is the evident underdelegation
concern that underlies the court’s approach. In IGRA, Congress drew
some lines about which kinds of compacts could be approved, which
should be disapproved, and how the Secretary may signal approval.
These lines turn on “consisten[cy] with” IGRA, which in turn requires
interpretation of IGRA’s terms—necessarily a task for the courts.247
Congress must therefore have intended the courts to play a role in reviewing the Secretary’s approvals and disapprovals—otherwise, there
would be no opportunity for the courts to assess “consisten[cy] with”
IGRA.248 But that in turn means that any approval or disapproval decision must be reviewable agency action—even a no-action approval.
Otherwise, the Secretary could always escape review by issuing only noaction approvals. In other words, Congress plainly intended the courts
to play a role in reviewing IGRA approvals and disapprovals; permitting
the Secretary to defy that intent by issuing unreviewable no-action ap242 SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64.
243 Amador Cnty., 640 F.3d at 382.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 380 (finding a necessary role for the courts because IGRA “provides that only
lawful compacts can become effective,” and “someone—i.e., the courts—must decide
whether those provisions are in fact lawful”).
248 Id.
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provals would encroach on Congress’s power to delimit agency authority and, in turn, undermine the legitimacy of the agency’s policy choices. Thus, we suggest, the Amador County court could have reached the
same result (no-action-approvals must be reviewable) with greater clarity and confidence by considering the separation of powers implications of the Secretary’s claim of unreviewability.
Conclusion
Agencies are not passive participants in court oversight of administrative action. Rather, they actively modulate oversight by structuring
their actions in ways that may induce courts to delay or deny review. We
argue that courts should recognize this tactical activity for what it is:
executive curtailment of judicial review and, possibly, encroachment on
legislative and judicial prerogatives. When a case squarely presents the
question whether Congress may delegate to an agency the authority to
shield its decisions from judicial oversight, courts almost universally
recognize that such an “extraordinary delegation” would raise separation of powers concerns. Yet the same concerns lurk in the background
of all so-called “reviewability” cases. In particular, these concerns arise
when Congress has created an administrative regime that expressly or
implicitly anticipates expansive judicial review and an agency wields
reviewability as a shield against court oversight, thereby threatening the
legitimacy of both the governing regime and the agency’s role in implementing that regime.

